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During the last decades new pay systems have been widely introduced in the 
OECD countries. Experiments draw attention to some aspects which are 
normally not included in analyses of the new pay systems, namely fairness and 
reciprocity. Furthermore, the experiments indicate another understanding of 
what are perceived as gains and losses than what is assumed in conventional 
economic theory, and an asymmetric evaluation of gains and losses. These 
insights have important implications for the management of the new pay 
systems in the public sector. 
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During the last decades, new forms of pay systems known from the private 
sector have been widely introduced in the public sector in the OECD countries 
(OECD 2005a, 2005b) as a part of varying forms of New Public Management 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). Earlier, nearly all civil servants in the OECD 
member countries were paid according to salary scales. The pay systems that 
have been introduced differ from country to country, however, a central feature 
is pay flexibility, implying the differentiation and individualisation of wages. A 
superstructure of supplements, and in many countries performance-related pay, 
is added to basic pay (OECD 2005b). Pay is now a management tool. In 
Denmark, pay supplements are subject to negotiations between the employer 
and the employees' union or its local representative, however, the managers 
have a decisive influence on the allocation of supplements. The public sector 
employers also stress that managers should actively use pay as a management 
tool. 
 
Broadly, the changes in the pay systems have the following distinctive features: 
 
The same category of civil servants’ wages are differentiated according to 
managers’ discretion. Whilst the earlier system also implied differences in wages 
for the same type of civil servants, these differences were caused by the pay 
scale system and were widely related to seniority. In contrast to this, in the new 
pay systems, differentiations in wages are the result of the deliberate intention 
of public managers. 
 
Moreover, while the individual employee knew his or her future income as 
changes were closely related to seniority, the new pay systems imply a 
considerable uncertainty as regards the future income of the individual 
employee. An employee can gain either a larger or a lower increase in wages 
than expected.  
 
These changes raise questions regarding, firstly, how the individual employee 
will assess and react to wage disparities compared to others, secondly, the 
significance of the fact that disparities in wages are the consequence of 
deliberate intention, and, thirdly, how the individual employee will assess and 
respond to wage supplements which are lower than expected or do not 
materialize. The answers to these questions have important implications for the 
management of the pay systems. 
 
Experiments provide insights which have implications for these questions. This 
paper provides some results from these experiments. It is indicated that the 
evaluation of a given wage is not only – as it is assumed in conventional 
economic theory – dependent on the size of the wage. Experiments indicate 
that perceived fairness and intentions affect how a given wage is evaluated. 
Furthermore, it is indicated that evaluations of whether changes in wages are 
considered as gains or losses are not - as it is also assumed in conventional 
economic theory - dependent on final states. What are considered as gains and 
losses are dependent on reference points. In relation to the evaluation of 
changes in wages, expectations concerning these changes become important as 
they become reference points for evaluation. Moreover, the experiments show 
reciprocity, which means a tendency to respond kindly towards actions that are 
perceived to be kind, and hostily towards actions that are perceived to be 
hostile even if it is costly. Also this contradicts the assumption of rational 
behaviour and that individuals care only about how much money they get, 
which is normally the assumption in conventional economic theory. An 
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implication is that wages and wage disparities perceived as fair, and wage 
increases in accordance to justified expectations, are not only in the interests of 
the public sector employees; they are also in the interests of the society at large 
in order to avoid a negative response from the public sector employees, which 
could mean lower effort, less engagement and loyalty. Thus, the management of 
the new pay systems must be undertaken in a way that is viewed as fair by the 
public sector employees as it is important for a well functioning public sector.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: First there is a brief presentation of 
experimental methods together with their advantages and disadvantages. The 
paper then moves on to examine some important results arising from 
experiments which cast light on the three questions above. A special group of 
experiments is designed to investigate the behaviour of experimental employer 
and employees. The results of the experiments are related to conventional 
economic theory and field studies. It is concluded that these experiments 
provide insights which have important implications for the management of the 
new pay systems. Some implications are discussed and important 
recommendations to managers are deduced. 
Experimental methods 
Since the 1980s, there has been a steady increase in the use of experimental 
methods in economics (Kagel and Roth 1995, Samuelson 2005). A basic 
problem associated with field studies is that a great number of factors influence 
the behaviour observed in real life situations. Laboratory experiments provide 
an opportunity to control the factors, which could influence behaviour, and 
changes in the conditions can be studied ceteris paribus. An experiment can, 
for instance, be designed in such a way that the participants only interact once. 
This means that behaviour cannot be explained by considerations of future 
interaction. 
 
There are also a number of objections to laboratory experiments (Smith 1994, 
Binmore 1999, Falk and Fehr 2003). A fundamental objection is that the 
behaviour in the laboratory can be different from behaviour in real life. As real 
money is used in the experiments, the number of persons in the experiments is 
typically small and so are, normally, the amounts at stake. The experimental 
subjects are self-selected and for practical reasons are often students and this 
raises questions about representiveness.  
 
An important challenge in relation to experiments is to reveal the aspects that 
can be of importance for the observed behaviour, which are however not 
included in the experiment. New experiments can then be carried out to shed 
light on the importance of these factors by varying the conditions under which 
the experiments are conducted. For instance, the effect of the stake level can be 
examined. The rapidly growing research using experimental methods is also 
characterized by attempts to investigate the effects of varying conditions. 
 
While one type of experiment is designed to reveal preferences by observing 
actual behaviour under laboratory conditions, another type of experiment 
investigates reported preferences. In these experiments, subjects are presented 
with various hypothetical choice problems and asked to answer which of the 
alternatives they prefer. Here, a fundamental problem is the generalizability of 
the results from hypothetical situations. The advantage of the first type of 
experiments is that subjects’ real choices and not only hypothetical choices are 
examined. However, the demand that choices should be real, limits the type of 
choices which can be studied. For instance, the stakes have to be rather small. 




contribute insights, which can be combined with the knowledge gained from 
field studies or motivate new field studies. Moreover, they can cause reflection 
in relation to policy makers and policy (Roth 1995a), as with the case of the 
new pay systems in the public sector which are discussed here. 
The Ultimatum Game 
A classic experiment is the Ultimatum Game, which since the seminal work of 
Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) has been carried out in a lot of 
studies under varying conditions.1 Basically, the game is described as follows. A 
proposer is provisionally assigned an amount of (real) money and asked to 
propose an offer to a second person, the responder. The responder may then 
either accept the offer or reject it. If the offer is accepted, the two players 
receive the proposed amounts. If the responder rejects the offer, the two 
receive nothing. The offer of the proposer is an ultimatum, as is suggested by 
the name of the game: Accept the offer or nothing. The game is of the one-
shot type, meaning that interaction only takes place once.  
 
Assuming rational behaviour and that individuals care only about how much 
money they get - a basic assumption in traditional economic theory - the 
proposal should be accepted if the responder receives any positive amount. 
Because the responder would then be better off. Therefore, it would also be 
rational if the proposer offered the responder the least possible amount. 
However, the amount offered to the responder is typically much larger. The 
modal offers are in the range of 40-50 per cent, and often a fifty-fifty split is 
made.2 It is also remarkable that offers lower than 20 per cent are rejected with 
a probability of 40-60 per cent. The experiments have been carried out with the 
same type of results in many industrialized societies3 (Camerer 2003, Roth 
1995b). 
 
It has been discussed whether a rise in the stake level would change the results 
(Camerer and Thaler 1995, Rabin 1993: 1284). Obviously, it is difficult to test 
the results with large stakes as real money is involved. However, the basic 
results have been replicated for stakes of up to three months’ wages, and 
generally high stakes have only a minor impact on the experimental results 
(Fehr and Schmidt 2003: 215 ff, Camerer 2003, Roth 1995, Carpenter, 
Verhoogen and Burks 2005). Moreover, experiments have been carried out 
with players with different degrees of anonymity and with players of different 
types, different experience and education and gender. For a summary and 
references, see Samuelson (2005: 66-67) and Camerer and Fehr (2004: 70-71). 
Some of such variations matter. However, still the same basic results are 
reported. 
 
There are several possible explanations of the observation that the proposer 
typically offers an amount much larger than the least possible.4 An explanation 
could be that proposers are fair-minded (Camerer and Thaler 1995: 213). The 
explanation could, however, also be that the proposer has anticipated that low 
offers would be rejected with a high rate of probability. That the responders’ 
possibility to refuse is decisive, is indicated by another classic game, namely the 
dictator game. In a dictator game, a person, a dictator, is assigned an amount 
                                                     
1 For a survey of conventions in economic experimentation, see Camerer and Fehr 
2004. 
2 For a review of results, see Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003: 174) and Roth (1995b). 
3 In other cultures the results differ remarkably (Henrich et al. 2004). 
4 A number of possible explanations is discussed in Fehr and Schmidt (2003), Falk, 




and asked to propose an offer to a second person, the responder. The 
responder must accept any proposal. Often something is given to the other 
person, but the size varies according to the design of the experiments (Camerer 
and Thaler 1995, Roth 1995b). The offers in the dictator game are, however, 
much lower than in the ultimatum game. An interpretation of the responder’s 
behaviour in the ultimatum game is that the responder reacts against being 
treated unfairly and this is anticipated by the proposer. Therefore the proposer 
offers an amount so large that it is expected the offer will be accepted. 
Reciprocity 
The behaviour of the responder can be described by the term reciprocity. 
Reciprocity means a tendency to respond kindly to perceived kindness and 
unkindly to perceived unkindness even when it is costly to respond and yields 
neither present nor future material rewards (Fehr and Gächter 2000, Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2005). A tendency to respond kindly to perceived kindness is 
termed positive reciprocity, and a tendency to respond unkindly to perceived 
unkindness is termed negative reciprocity. The behaviour of the responder in the 
ultimatum game indicates negative reciprocity. It is important to stress that the 
behaviour is not strategically motivated. The behaviour of the responder is not 
motivated by considerations about the proposer’s offer in a later run of the 
ultimatum game, because the game is only played once. Reciprocity is a 
property of preferences. Sobel (2005) uses the term intrinsic reciprocity5, while 
others use the term strong reciprocity (Fehr and Fischbacher 2005). This is 
quite different from instrumental reciprocity, which is the result of optimizing 
actions of selfish agents who are responding to kindness with kindness or 
unkindness with unkindness to influence behaviour in the future. This type of 
reciprocity could be called strategic reciprocity. While instrumental or strategic 
reciprocity can lead to deviations from a self-interested behaviour in repeated 
games, intrinsic or strong reciprocity can cause deviations even in one-shot 
games as in the ultimatum game. 
 
A crucial question is, then, how people evaluate whether an action is kind or 
unkind. The evaluation could depend on outcomes. This means that the 
interpretation depends on the distributional consequences. In the ultimatum game, 
the responder’s evaluation would then be based on the distributional 
consequences of the proposer’s action. The interpretation of the responder’s 
behaviour is therefore that the responder rejects an offer because it is viewed as 
unkind if the distribution between the responder and proposer is too unequal. 
A model based on an idea of inequity-aversion, which means that individuals 
resist inequitable outcomes and are willing to give up some material payoff to 
move in the direction of more equitable outcomes, was formulated by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999).6 The inequity-aversion was self-centered, meaning that people 
suffer more from inequity that is to their disadvantage than from inequity that 
is to their advantage. They are to a larger extent willing to give up some material 
pay off if it reduces an inequity which is unfavourable for themselves, than if it 
is favourable (Fehr and Schmidt 1999: 818). 
Intentions matter 
A number of experiments indicate, however, that the intention is decisive for 
the evaluation of whether an action is perceived as kind or unkind. If the 
                                                     
5 For various reciprocity concepts, see Sobel (2005). 
6 A similar early outcome-based model was formulated by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). 





unequal distribution in the ultimatum game is a matter of chance, as it is the 
case when the offer to the responder is generated by a random mechanism, 
responders who are informed about this condition are far more inclined to 
accept a small share than if the same small offer is the deliberate intention of 
the proposer (Blount 1995). An interpretation of this experiment could be that 
the distribution is viewed as procedurally fair, and this is the reason for a higher 
tendency to accept small offers (Bolton and Ockenfels 2005: 958). This reason 
could, however, not explain the behaviour in the ultimatum game in another 
experiment in which the same procedure was used in two different treatment 
conditions. In this experiment, the the proposer’s alternatives are restricted to 
two, and the responder is informed about that. In the first condition, the 
proposer must choose between a 80:20 and a 50:50 split. In the second 
condition, the proposer must choose between a 80:20 and a 20:80 split. So 
while an equal split was feasible in the first condition, it was not feasible in the 
other. It turned out that the split 80:20 was rejected significantly less often 
when an equal split was not feasible (Fehr and Schmidt 2003: 224). With more 
than two alternatives, the probability of a rejection of a given unequal split is 
larger the more equal split it is possible to make (Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher 
2003). 
 
An interpretation of this is that the same distribution, dependent on the 
conditions, can give different signals about the proposer’s intentions of being 
fair, and the different signals trigger different behavioural responses. That 
intentions matter is also in accordance with experiences from daily life. If 
damage is caused by intention, the reaction will be stronger than if it is caused 
by accident. In a summary of results of experiments investigating the 
significance of intentions, it is also concluded that “Intentions matter. Of 
course this insight can only be surprising to us economists”.... (Oechssler 2003: 
197). 
 
Furthermore, there is experimental evidence that negative intentions provoke 
much stronger reciprocal responses than positive ones (Offerman 2002). 
Abbink et al. (2000) also found that hostile actions are much more consistently 
punished than friendly actions are rewarded.  
 
That intention alone cannot explain the behaviour of the responder in the 
ultimatum game is indicated by an experiment in which the proposer did not 
have any alternative to the 80:20 split and the responder knew that. If only 
intentions induce the response, the responder should accept the offer of 20 per 
cent in all cases. This was however not the case (Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher 
2003). Neither could intentions alone explain the behaviour of the proposer, as 
the proposer has nothing to respond to in the ultimatum game and the dictator 
game7.  
                                                     
7 An early model that incorporated intentions was formulated by Rabin (1993). This 
model has been developed further by Falk and Fischbacher (Falk and Fischbacher 
2006) who incorporate both the concern for the outcome per se as well as for the 
underlying intention. Bolton and Ockenfels (2005) argue for distribution models, 
however, the assessments of outcomes are dependent on a reference point conditioned 
of feasible actions. A basic problem related to the development of models is the 
potential conflicts between more complicated models, providing more precise 
predictions under rather specific conditions, and more simple models, giving reasonable 




Wages and effort 
The assumption that fairness is important in social interaction is well known 
from sociological theory. That an individual will try to establish a balance 
between input and outcomes in social interaction is known from ’equity theory’ 
(Adams 1965). In a seminal work 'Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange' 
Akerlof (1982) argued that wages could be interpreted as part of a gift exchange 
in which the level of the wage affects the employees’ norm for what a fair effort 
is.8 Akerlof and Yellen (1990) developed the idea further to a fair wage-effort 
hypothesis. According to this, employees have a conception of a fair wage; if 
the wages are less than the fair wage, the effort is also smaller than it would be 
if the wage was ‘fair’.9
 
A special group of experiments have been designed to investigate the behaviour 
of experimental employers and employees. Several of these experiments show 
that employees respond to the level of their wages in a way which could be 
interpreted as reciprocal behaviour (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993, Hannan 
et al 2002, Brandts and Charness 2004). In an experiment, experimental 
employers offered a wage contract that stipulated a wage and a desired level of 
effort (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993). Experimental workers decided 
whether they would accept the offered contract, and if they decided to do so, 
they afterwards chose the effort level. To spend effort is associated with costs 
for the workers. The larger the effort spent, the larger is the outcome for the 
employer, however the larger is also the costs for the employee.10 The 
employers could not enforce the level of effort desired. The workers make their 
choices after wages have been fixed and there is no monitoring or sanctioning 
of any kind. The contract is then incomplete, as important aspects are not 
contracted in a way that can be verified by a third party. It was found that for 
many of the experimental workers, the choice of effort level was dependent on 
the level of the wages they were offered. The response to generous wages is 
from many workers a generous effort. The larger the wage is, the larger the 
effort. However, there are considerable individual variations. 
 
It is indicated that a close relationship between wages and effort is anticipated 
by the employers under conditions in which the contract is incomplete. If the 
employer cannot control the level of effort, the wages are not competed down 
to the level that would bring a balance between supply and demand of labour. 
Instead, the employers offer a higher wage, as is suggested by the experiment 
above. In an experiment (Fehr and Falk 1999) experimental firms could offer 
wages and experimental workers could give wage bids. Every worker and every 
firm always knew all offers and bids that had been submitted so far. The 
number of workers exceeded the number of jobs. Just as in the experiment 
above, the firm could not control the worker’s effort. A firm could only employ 
one worker and a worker could accept only one job. Both firms and workers 
earned a profit of zero if they did not conclude a contract. To accept a job was 
for the workers associated with costs, given as 20. The number of workers was 
larger than the number of jobs. The surplus of workers means that the wage 
creating equilibrium between demand and supply then was 20. The wage level 
was, however, not competed down to this level. Massive underbidding by the 
                                                     
8 The same idea was suggested early by Solow (1980). 
9 In the model of Akerlof and Yellen, the relation between wages and effort is based on 
psychological considerations, while the classic Shapiro-Stiglitz model (1984) assume 
that a higher wage level is associated with a higher effort level as the costs of being 
dismissed in case of shirking is increased. For a review of various types of efficiency 
wage models, see Yellen (1984).  




workers was observed, as a consequence of the competition for the scarce jobs. 
In spite of that, the employers rejected low wage offers and did not hire the 
employees with the lowest wage offers. The employers’ wage offers were on 
average higher than the level of the workers’ bids. It was also observed that the 
effort level chosen by the workers reflected the wage level. The larger the wages 
were, the larger was the effort.  
 
For comparison, a similar experiment was carried out, however, it differed as 
effort was exogenously fixed. This contract was complete. Under these 
conditions, the employers took advantage of the workers’ underbidding. In 
contrast to the earlier case, the wage level converged at the equilibrium level. 
 
The differences between the two results could be interpreted in the light of 
reciprocity. With an incomplete contract, a reciprocal worker is able to punish 
the employer by choosing a low effort level (Fehr and Falk 1999). Firms 
anticipating this will be induced to pay generous wages. With a complete 
contract, the workers do not have the opportunity to punish the firm by 
choosing a low level of effort. The only method for a worker to punish a firm 
which offers a low wage is to reject the low offer. Although reciprocal workers 
did that, others who are only interested in their own material outcome, would 
choose to accept the low wage offer. Thus, reciprocal employees have no 
possibility to punish firms, and they are therefore induced to accept low wage 
offers too. Employers who anticipate this are not induced to offer generous 
wages. 
 
In a large American survey based on interviews, Bewley (1999) examined why 
only a few firms reduced the level of wages during the recession in the early 
1990’s. It was found that employers were reluctant to cut pay because they 
believed that it would adversely affect work morale and cause a decrease in 
productivity.11 There is also strong evidence that the quality of Firestone tyres 
decreased significantly after the management, in 1994, announced that it 
wanted to reduce the wages of new hires by 30 per cent (Fehr and Falk 2002: 
692).  
 
Experiments based on questions in which the responders are asked to answer 
whether various hypothetical dispositions are viewed as fair or not, indicate that 
the assessment of whether wage cuts are viewed as fair depends on the 
situation. If the company is loosing money, a larger fraction of people find it 
fair to reduce wages than if it is done to exploit unemployment (Kahneman et 
al.1986: 733). 
 
Considerable downward wage rigidities are an empirical phenomenon 
confirmed by many studies, see Bewley (1999) and Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2000) for summaries and references. 
Repeated games 
The experiments above have been one-shot games. It is remarkable that even in 
the situations in which the actors interact only once, there are a number who 
behave as reciprocal actors. The fraction of subjects who show a concern for 
fairness and behave reciprocally in one-shot situations is, based on a number of 
studies, reported as being between 40 and 66 per cent (Fehr and Gächter 1998a: 
847, Fehr and Gächter 2000: 162). Between 20 and 30 percent of the subjects 
                                                     
11 In conditions of inflation real wages can be reduced without reducing the nominal 
wages. However, Fehr and Götte (2005) found evidence for wage rigidity also under 




do not reciprocate and behave completely selfishly being only interested in their 
own material payoff.12  
 
In labour relations, actors interact again and again. Experiments made as 
repeated games in which actors meet each other again, implying that behaviour 
in one period can have consequences for the behaviour in the next period, 
show that under these circumstances a larger fraction act as reciprocal actors 
(Gächter and Falk 2002, Fehr and Falk 2002).  
Loss and loss aversion 
It is indicated by experiments that what are considered as gains and losses is 
based on reference points rather than on final assets as is the assumption in 
conventional economic theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The choice of 
reference point is then decisive for what is considered as a loss or gain. The 
reference point can be formed by expectations. For example, an unexpected tax 
withdrawal from a monthly pay check is experienced as a loss and not as a 
reduced gain. Similarly a smaller loss than expected can be interpreted as a gain 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 286). 
 
Furthermore, experiments indicate an asymmetry in the evaluation of gains and 
losses, termed loss aversion: Losses loom larger than corresponding gains. The 
positive value of gaining a given amount is less than the negative value of 
loosing the same amount (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 279 ff.). More 
generally, the impact of a difference on a dimension is generally greater when 
the difference is evaluated as a loss, than when the same difference is evaluated 
as a gain (Tversky and Kahneman 1991).  
Experiments: Some implications in relation to the new pay 
systems 
The experiments provide insights with important implications for the 
management of pay systems. The ultimatum game indicates a widespread 
tendency to respond negatively reciprocally on offers which are seen as unfair. 
An implication of negative reciprocal behaviour is that employees who perceive 
their wage to be unfair will respond in a negative way. Perceived unfairness, 
then, is not only a problem for the individual employee, but also for the 
employer to the extent that the employees respond negatively. The response 
may depend on the type of job and the degrees of freedom in the job. Most 
employees in the public sector have discretion over the work effort, at least in 
relation to the qualitative dimensions. The reaction could be less effort, less 
loyalty, less engagement, initiative and service in relation to users, clients and 
citizens which all in all reduce the quality of welfare services. 
 
The indications that intention is of importance for the evaluation of a situation 
has also important implications for pay systems. A wage system based on 
seniority imply differences in wages which could be considered unfair. These 
differences are, however, inherent in the pay system. Under the new pay 
system, individual pay differences are widely caused by differences in pay 
supplements, which are provided according to the managers’ discretion. This 
means that wage differences are the consequence of the managers’ intentions. 
Wage differences, which are viewed as unfair, could then to a larger extent 
induce a negative response than wage differences which are the consequence of 
a seniority based pay system and not the intention of the managers. 
                                                     





Considerations about effectiveness in the public sector point to the importance 
of avoiding wages being perceived as unfair. This means that the managers 
should devote effort to ensuring that there is a broad acceptance of criteria for 
supplements and bonuses and that supplements and bonuses are allocated 
loyally in accordance with the criteria. Negative responses to differentiations in 
wages, which are considered to be unfair, are an argument for being cautious 
with differentiations when the basis for the differentiation is uncertain or when 
it due to other reasons could not be expected that differentiations will be 
accepted as fair. 
Evaluation of fairness: The reference actors 
When fairness judgments are made by comparison to another or others, who 
are reference actors for the comparison, a question arises as to who the 
reference actors are. For an employee, relevant reference actors are colleagues 
in the same organisation (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002, Akerlof and Yellen 
1990).  
 
Right of access to documents in the public sector, as in Denmark, means that 
employees have possibilities to compare their wages with colleagues in their 
own organisation (Bregn 2003). These possibilities do not exist for employees 
in the private sector. Taking colleagues in the same organisation as the relevant 
reference group implies that an employee could view his wage as unfairly low 
although it is higher than the wage which could be otherwise obtained. 
Employees could then perceive that they are treated hostilely, even if their wage 
is higher than the wage for similar jobs in other organisations. Again the effect 
could be a negative response on the account of the quality of public services 
depending on the specific conditions of the job. With the employees in the 
same organisation as the reference group for comparisons of wages, wage 
differences viewed as unfair can lead to demotivated employees who are 
remaining in the same organisation. If the wage is larger than what alternatively 
could be obtained, it is impossible to find another job without realizing a wage 
decrease. Such a decrease would be a loss, which is sought to be avoided. It is 
then, not only important to be aware that the general level of wages is 
reasonable, but also to draw attention to the importance of perceived fairness 
in the internal wage relations.  
 
That people care about their relative incomes and not only the absolute income 
is found in a number of studies (Clark and Oswald 1996, Loewenstein et al 
1989, Solnick and Hemenway 1998). Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997: 350) 
asked subjects to consider two individuals who graduated from the same 
college and upon graduation took similar jobs in two similar firms. The first 
started with a salary of $36,000 in a firm where the average starting salary was $ 
40,000 while the other started with a salary of $ 34,000 in a firm where the 
average starting salary was $ 30,000. While the first then had a higher absolute 
salary, the other had a higher income relative to her co-workers. When 180 
subjects were asked whom of the two was happier with her job situation 80 per 
cent chose the person with the lower absolute salary, but better relative 
position. When another group of respondents were asked who they thought 
was more likely to leave her position for another firm, 66 per cent chose the 
person with the higher absolute salary but the lower relative position.  
 
Evidence from some experiments indicate that many subjects compare 
themselves with other people in the group and not just to the group average or 
the group as a whole, however the evidence is mixed (Fehr and Schmidt 2003, 




Loss and loss aversion: some implications 
The experimental results according to which reference points determine 
whether changes are seen as gains and losses, suggest that expectations to 
supplements are important. If an employee expects a supplement, the award of 
a supplement could be the reference point for the evaluation of what is a gain 
or a loss. It is then perceived as a loss if a supplement is not obtained. Even a 
wage increase could be considered as a loss if a larger increase was expected. 
The perception of being inflicted a loss could then trigger a negative response. 
To avoid this, justified expectations should be fulfilled and expectations be 
realistic. A tendency to optimistic expectations or a self-serving bias in 
evaluations (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Camerer 1995, Babcock and 
Loewenstein 1997, Gilovich et al. 2002) implies the importance of managers 
contributing actively to a realistic formation of expectations. It is an essential 
task for the management to inform employees about criteria and the expected 
possibilities for wage increments. Furthermore, the allocation of supplements 
should be provided in accordance with the criteria. 
 
A consequence of loss aversion and evidence indicating that negative intentions 
are more likely to cause response than are positive intentions, could be that the 
negative reactions from employees who are not receiving supplements or are 
receiving supplements smaller than what is expected and viewed as fair, could 
exceed the gain of providing supplements. This too is an argument for careful 
consideration concerning differentiations, in particular if there is not a 
formation of expectations, which implies that differentiations will be viewed as 
fair. 
 
In particular the cessation of supplements can because of loss aversion be 
considered as a hostile action with negative implications for motivation and 
efficiency. Non-permanent supplements could then have negative implications 
for motivation and efficiency. When supplements that are not permanent are 
provided, it is decisive that the management supports a realistic formation of 
expectations concerning wages in the future, such that it is well known for the 
employee whether and under which conditions supplements could be 
withdrawn. 
Conclusion 
The new pay systems introduced in the public sector, not only in Denmark but 
also widely in the OECD countries, mean the wages for the employees in the 
public sector are individualised and differentiated, and that the future situation 
with respect to income is no longer known. Experiments suggest that analyses 
of the new pay systems should include considerations concerning fairness, 
which are not included in conventional economic analyses. Furthermore, they 
should consider the implications of a behavioural assumption of reciprocity, 
which is different from the assumption of pure self-interest in conventional 
economic theory. Moreover, it should be taken into consideration that what is 
perceived as gains and losses is dependent on reference points. This means that 
what is perceived as gains and losses in relation to wages are not necessarily 
equal to wage changes as it is the assumption in conventional economic theory. 
 
In particular, attention is drawn to the importance of wages which the 
employees perceive as fair. Lack of perceived fairness in wages based on 
performance is found in many studies (Marsden and French 1998, Marsden 
2004, OECD 1997, 2005b, Milkovich og Wigdor 1991). To avoid this is 
important not only to take care of the employees and the working environment, 




reciprocal responses to differences in pay that are seen as unfair. The fact that 
differences in pay within the new pay systems – in contradiction to the 
differences with pay systems based on seniority - are the consequence of 
deliberate choice, increases the potential negative responses to those 
differences, which are viewed as unfair. This raises considerable challenges 
concerning the management of the pay system.  
 
That evaluations of whether wage changes are considered as gains or losses are 
based on reference points means that even a wage increase can be perceived as 
representing a loss if a larger increase was expected. This together with loss 
aversion implies that attention should be drawn to the managers’ responsibility 
for realistic formation of expectations and provision of supplements and 
bonuses implying that reasonable expectations are met.  
 
Considerations about avoiding wage differences viewed as unfair, as well as 
considerations about avoiding negative responses to losses and loss aversion, 
suggest a considerable cautiousness in relation to wage differences if the basis 
for the differentiations is uncertain, if the managers are not trusted, or if it 
because of other reasons, could not – as least for the moment – be expected to 
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